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Latin America*
Latin American, as a region, continues to struggle with its enormous
foreign debt burden. As discussed below, various nations have enacted
or further developed legislation governing "debt-equity swaps." In ad-
dition, certain measures have been taken to attract private foreign in-
vestment and transfers of technology, particularly within the Andean
Common Market (that is, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Vene-
zuela). These measures are summarized immediately below. The discus-
sion then turns to legal developments in specific Latin American countries.
I. Andean Common Market
For nearly two decades, the Andean Common Market's rules governing
foreign equity investments, loans, and technology agreements were con-
tained in its Commission's Decision No. 24, as amended. The Commission
has now replaced Decision No. 24 with Decision No. 220, presumably so
as to attract foreign investors, lenders, and suppliers of technology to
transact business within the Andean Common Market. Indeed, while De-
cision No. 24 prohibited foreign investors from acquiring equity interests
held by national investors, Decision No. 220 promotes foreign investors
by expressly allowing for such equity acquisitions, if permitted under the
domestic legislation of the respective member country. Similarly, Decision
No. 220 should encourage intergroup transfers of technology, because it
empowers the various national authorities to allow royalty payments by
local companies to their foreign parent or affiliated companies; in contrast,
Decision No. 24 absolutely prohibited such intergroup royalty payments.
In addition, Decision No. 220 codifies and sanctions a number of the
largely divergent rules previously enacted or applied de facto by Col-
ombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela in implementing Decision No. 24,
and specifically delegates additional legislative authority to the various
member countries. This approach is most evident in connection with the
rules on transformations/divestitures, capitalization of royalty payments,
limitations on dividend remittances, and election of foreign law and sub-
mission to foreign jurisdiction in connection with contractual arrangements.
*Prepared by Jorge Cubas, Sergio Leiseca, Michael Mensik, Sebastiao Mattos, Paul
Slocomb, and Tom Studwell, Baker & McKenz~e, Chicago, Illinois.
LATIN AMERICA 223
A. Transformations/Divestitures
Decision No. 220 requires that a majority foreign-owned company be
transformed into a mixed company (i.e., fifty-one percent local ownership
with proportionate management control) only if it desires to export its
products throughout the Andean Common Market under the then available
Andean Common Market trade benefits. A similar rule already existed in
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
Decision No. 220 appears to provide a significant incentive to foreign
investors by not limiting foreign equity participations in marketing and
various other activities to twenty percent of capital, as was generally the
case under Decision No. 24. In fact, however, Decision No. 24 authorized
member countries to elect not to apply that highly restrictive rule, so that
Decision No. 220 may be viewed simply as an election by the member
countries not to limit generally foreign equity participation in marketing
such activities.
B. CAPITALIZATION OF ROYALTY PAYMENTS
Decision No. 220, which retains the prohibition against contributions
to capital in the form of "technology," permits accrued royalties to be
capitalized upon payment of applicable taxes. A similar rule already ap-
plied in Venezuela.
C. DIVIDEND REMITTANCES
Although Decision No. 220 retains the limitation on yearly dividend
remittances to amounts equal to twenty percent of registered investments,
it empowers each member country to establish a higher limit at its dis-
cretion. Thus, for example, Ecuador may continue to limit generally these
annual remittances to thirty percent (forty percent if at least forty percent
of annual production is exported), and Venezuela may continue to limit
such remittances to twenty percent, plus LIBOR.
D. FOREIGN LAW AND JURISDICTION
Decision No. 24 prohibited covenants submitting disputes derived from
contracts providing for foreign equity investments or transfers of tech-
nology to the jurisdiction of foreign courts for resolution. Based on that
rule, various member countries also prohibited a choice of foreign law to
govern contractual disputes. Decision No. 220 leaves the matter of gov-
erning law in such cases to be legislated by the individual member coun-
tries, a choice that may not promote uniformity of legal treatment
throughout the Andean Common Market, but that should be greeted fa-
vorably by the foreign investor.
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II. Argentina
Over the past few months, Argentina has announced and provided the
framework for a debt conversion program. The program provides for the
conversion into Argentine australs, over a period of five years, of U.S.
$1.9 billion of foreign debt of the Argentine Government, its Central Bank,
and other elements of its public sector, with the local currency to be
applied to investment in the Argentine private sector. While touting sim-
plicity as one of its principal features, the program is quite complicated.
A few of its salient features are sketched briefly.
The debt that may be converted includes virtually all foreign currency
indebtedness of Argentina's public sector. Such debt may be paid in aus-
trals, provided that the austral proceeds are used for the purchase of new
equipment and construction of plants and other works. They may not be
invested in real estate, acquisition of existing shares of companies, or
financial investments. The stated purpose of the program is for the austral
proceeds to be used to increase the supply of goods and services in
Argentina and to improve its balance of payments.
A party wishing to use the debt conversion program must first present
an application which, if approved within the allowed forty-five day period,
results in the qualification of an "eligible investment." The application is
rather detailed. In general, it must describe the project and the financial
plan for the utilization of the funds.
The most significant features of the program involve matching funds
and a kind of public bidding. Once a prospective investor has an invest-
ment declared eligible, it must participate in an auction, pursuant to which
it must offer matching funds in an amount at least equivalent to the amount
of the debt to be converted to australs. The matching funds may be in
the form of new investment or medium- or long-term loans. Qualifying
matching funds are specified. Some items qualify as matching funds with-
out limitation. These include, for example, loans having a minimum term
of six years, with four years of grace, and 1987 series Bonex. Other items
may be used only to the extent of fifty percent of the total amount of
matching funds. These include, for example, certain financing from the
International Finance Corporation and the Interamerican Investment
Corporation.
The winners of the auction are to be those who offer the greatest pro-
portion of matching funds by comparison with the amount of the debt to
be converted. The rules contemplate that a discount offered by the bidder
in the future also may be taken into account.
To participate in bidding, the party wishing to take advantage of the
debt conversion program must post certain guarantees. Those successful
in the auction have the funds resulting from payment in australs of the
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foreign indebtedness deposited in a frozen account. Amounts received by
virtue of the auction, and the matching funds contributed as a part of the
process, must not be diverted from their stated purpose for a period of
three years. In addition, amounts resulting from the debt conversion in-
vested in Argentine enterprises cannot be repatriated for a period of ten
years, and dividends may not be paid on that portion of the capital of the
Argentine company for a period of four years.
As indicated above, the program contains some fairly significant re-
strictions with respect to the use of funds derived from the debt conversion
program. In addition, the amount to be converted over five years (less
than U.S. $2 billion) is not particularly substantial in light of the overall
level of Argentina's foreign indebtedness. Nevertheless, the results under
the regulations, in particular those relating to exchange rates, may be
such that the program will, after investigation, prove to be quite attractive
to those wishing to make investments in Argentina.
III. Brazil
The most recent proposals for a debt-to-equity conversion program
were presented by Brazil's Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM)
and by Brazil's Finance Minister, Mr. Bresser Fereira. The proposals have
four purposes:
1. To allow nonresident corporations to purchase negotiable instruments
issued by Brazil's creditor banks secured by their deposits with the Bra-
zilian Central Bank (DFA deposits). Thereafter, such instruments could
be redeemed with the Central Bank at face value and the proceeds invested
in local companies. The investment would be U.S.-dollar-denominated,
and equivalent cruzados would be made available by the Central Bank to
the local company where the investment is being made. Upon sale of the
negotiable instruments, the selling bank would relinquish an equivalent
amount of its deposit(s) with the Central Bank. The Central Bank likely
will require the nonresident corporation to present evidence of purchase
of and payment for the instruments. If the nonresident buyer/investor
purchases the instruments at a discount from the official exchange rate,
the Central Bank may request the buyer/investor to make a cash invest-
ment in the local company equal to the discount.
2. To create mutual investment funds managed by one or more creditor
banks or their Brazilian affiliates. Creditor banks would cancel a portion
of the Brazilian debt by issuing and selling fund shares to nonresident
investors. Thereupon, the Central Bank would make an equivalent amount
in cruzados available to the fund to be invested in the local stock markets
or other areas.
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3. To allow debts to be converted into equity in joint ventures involving
Brazilian companies. The Central Bank has already approved some debt-
to-equity conversions of this nature. One that was recently approved
involved the Bank of Scotland and the Norwest Bank of Minneapolis,
Minnesota. These banks converted $25 million in loans into equity of a
Brazilian paper and pulp company at par value. The two banks have
committed not to repatriate any capital out of Brazil for a twelve-year
period. Dividends are not subject to any restriction.
4. To convert a portion of the Brazilian debt into Brazilian government
bonds denominated in U.S. dollars or other hard currencies. The bonds
could be redeemed upon their maturity, or traded in the secondary market,
or converted into investment capital in Brazilian companies.
Whether and when any of these proposals will be adopted is still
uncertain.
IV. Colombia
The most important recent change in Colombian legislation in the in-
ternational context is a significant liberalization of foreign investment and,
to a lesser extent, technology transfer rules. Andean Common Market
Decision No. 220, replacing Decision No. 24, as amended, was followed
in July by Colombian Presidential Decree 1265 and CONPES Resolution
44.
Foreign government in Colombia still requires prior approval of the
National Planning Department, but a new rule requires this department
to respond to applications within forty-five days after application materials
are completed. If it fails to do so, the application is considered to be
approved. The new legislation also explicitly requires that approved for-
eign investments be registered with the Exchange Office of the Bank of
the Republic and gives a more explicit monitoring role to the Superinten-
dency of Companies.
Areas of possible foreign investment have been expanded. First, fewer
sectors of economic activity are reserved to Colombian investors. For
example, now no special rule applies to so-called "internal commercial-
ization" (e.g., marketing) companies. Second, foreign investors now can
acquire shares owned by national investors (which formerly required that
the Colombian company be in a state of imminent bankruptcy), provided
that a public offering of the shares is made to other Colombian investors.
The public offering requirement is subject to some important exceptions,
however, including the acquisition of less than ten percent of the out-
standing shares of a Colombian company. Third, foreign investment can
be in the form of capital increases. An old rule that did not permit the
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foreign share in a Colombian company to pass twenty percent and forty-
nine percent benchmarks has been repealed.
One of the few rules under the new legislation that apparently may be
less favorable to foreign investors deals with reinvestment of profits. The
automatic reinvestments permitted earlier have been scrapped. Now, ex-
cess profits may be reinvested only if (1) the Colombian company invests
fifty percent of the reinvestment in IFI bonds (an option available earlier,
and generally considered to be unattractive) or (2) the foreign investor
matches the amount of reinvestment with new investment from abroad,
on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
The annual remittance limit for profits now is generally set at twenty-
five percent of the amount of registered investment, but is higher in the
case of investments in minerals. With respect to repatriation of invested
capital, repatriation now is allowed explicitly in the event of capital re-
ductions, as well as liquidations. In addition, the remittance right now
turns upon "internal" sale, rather than sale to "national investors," a
change that, depending upon interpretation, may prove to be significant.
In any event, the new legislation explicitly denies remittance rights in the
event of a Colombian company's redemption of shares held by foreign
investors.
Other significant changes relate to so-called "transformation agree-
ments," pursuant to which a Colombian company is to be owned in pro-
gressively greater shares by Colombian shareholders. Under the new rules,
no transformation agreement is required, even with respect to newly formed
companies, if the company is not to take advantage of the Andean Com-
mon Market's trade liberalization programs. Specifically, with National
Planning Department approval, a foreign investor can own one hundred
percent of a Colombian enterprise and maintain that level of ownership.
In addition, transformation agreements are considerably more flexible
than before, both as to when they can be signed, and the new possibility
that once signed they may be cancelled. Finally, the term for transfor-
mation now is set at twenty years by Decision No. 220 and the internal
implementing Colombian legislation mandates that Colombian authorities
grant the maximum term, rather than setting a shorter term in their
discretion.
With respect to technology transfers, a contribution of technology in
exchange for stock of a company still is not possible. The new rules,
however, make it clear that royalties may be capitalized. This change is
especially significant because royalties now, with governmental approval,
can be paid by a Colombian subsidiary to its foreign parent. In addition,
the forty-five day rule mentioned earlier for response to an application
also applies to the Royalty Committee.
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While the effect of the changes has yet to be seen, it generally seems
clear that the rules of the game with respect to investment have been
liberalized substantially and those with respect to technology transfer to
a lesser degree. The National Planning Department, responsible for the
investment aspects, will have greater flexibility than in the past in its
attempt to encourage foreign investment. On the other hand, the Royalty
Committee has a bit, but not much, more flexibility, but really does not
need it in order to continue the rather negative policy Colombia has
followed for some time with respect to technology transfers.
V. Mexico
Mexico's latest public sector debt restructuring agreement has ex-
panded the scope of the so-called "debt swap program," successfully
implemented by the Mexican Government during the past year. The orig-
inal program allowed for conversion of Mexican public sector debt (UMS
Debt) held by foreign financial institutions into equity interests in Mexican
business enterprises. Only foreign investors were permitted to take ad-
vantage of the program.
The new version of section 5.11 of this restructured agreement, which
regulates the swap mechanism, now permits UMS Debt to be exchanged
for (1) stock or equivalent interests in Mexican entities (both public and
private, now also including Mexican trusts), (2) other private and public
Mexican debt, and (3) investments by Mexican nationals or entities. The
use of trusts for equity investments, the debt-for-debt swaps, and the
investments by Mexican nationals had not been contemplated by the
original program.
Although the original program has never been formally regulated by
statute, it has been administered by the Ministry of the Treasury and
Public Credit and the National Foreign Investment Commission, pursuant
to operating rules articulated by those agencies in their "Operating Man-
ual for the Substitution of Public Debt for Equity." Due to the more recent
changes to section 5.11, however, it is widely expected that new rules
will have to be issued, although as yet no timetable has been announced.
Pending the issuance of the new rules, the authorities will continue to
process debt-for-equity swaps based on the existing rules. Certain appli-
cations under the expanded section 5.11 (e.g., Mexican trusts) also may
be considered. Those involving debt-for-debt swaps, however, and qual-
ified investments by Mexican investors generally will not be processed
until guidelines are established.
A particularly thorny problem that may account for much of the delay
in issuing the new rules arises in connection wih the determination of the
types of investments that will be allowed to Mexican persons, as well as
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the mechanisms for channeling such investments. The government must
ensure that the proceeds invested by Mexican persons arise from prior
"flight" capital to be repatriated, or from profits legitimately earned and
maintained abroad, and not from dollars obtained currently on the Mex-
ican free market or in violation of the exchange control rules. At the same
time, in the midst of the electoral process, the government does not want
to be seen as bestowing special favors upon those holding "flight" capital
abroad.
VI. Venezuela
In April of 1987, the Venezuelan Government introduced legislation
creating a debt-to-equity conversion program, joining the growing ranks
of the Latin American countries (for example, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador,
and Mexico) with programs of this kind. With this program, the govern-
ment hopes to achieve a moderate reduction in Venezuela's substantial
foreign debt, while at the same time fomenting additional foreign invest-
ment in the private sector. The new legislation is contained in Decree No.
1521, published on April 14, 1987.
Decree No. 1521 offers foreign investors two basic forms of debt-to-
equity transactions: the capitalization of foreign debt in the debtor com-
pany; and the conversion of public sector foreign debt into equity in-
vestment. The decree also provides for the conversion of public sector
foreign debt into national investment, but gives an insufficient indication
of how such conversion would be carried out.
Capitalization of foreign debt in the debtor company already was an
option available to the foreign investor prior to the enactment of Decree
No. 1521. The decree largely refers to the preexisting statutory framework
contained in articles 63 and 64 of Decree No. 1200, but clarifies that the
capitalization of the foreign debt will be computed at the exchange rate
established in the applicable exchange agreements between the Finance
Ministry and the Central Bank, currently Bs 14.50 to U.S. $1.00. Capi-
talization of a debt consists of the issuance to the creditor of shares of
the debtor in exchange for the cancellation of the debt. The prior approval
of the Office of the Superintendent of Foreign Investments (SIEX) is
required. That the original creditor (in most cases a foreign bank) be the
investor is not required. Thus, a foreign enterprise wishing to acquire
stock in a particular Venezuelan company may purchase (presumably at
a negotiated discount) from a foreign bank or other creditor a loan or
trade credit payable by such company and then capitalize the credit so
acquired.
The capitalization format is intended principally for private sector debt,
but Decree No. 1521 does not exclude the capitalization of public sector
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debt. In the latter case, however, the restrictions imposed by the public
sector restructuring agreements with respect to repatriation of profits and
capital would presumably be taken into account by SIEX in authorizing
the capitalization.
The second form of debt-to-equity conversion contemplated by the
legislation involves: (1) the purchase by a foreign investor of a public
sector foreign credit from a foreign financial institution; (2) the sale of the
credit so acquired to the Central Bank of Venezuela in exchange for an
equivalent amount of Venezuelan bolivars or, at the Central Bank's option,
bolivar-denominated government obligations; and (3) the contribution of
the cash or instruments so received (or the product or the sale of such
instruments) to the capital of a new or existing Venezuelan company in
exchange for shares of the stock of such company. The Venezuelan public
sector debt is currently trading at approximately seventy percent of face
value. Thus, assuming the Central Bank purchases a credit at face value
or at a discount of less than thirty percent of face value, the foreign
investor may purchase the bolivars required to carry out its investment
at a cheaper rate than it would if it made its investment by a direct
contribution of foreign currency. In this regard, government officials have
indicated that, at least in the initial stages of the program, the Central
Bank will purchase foreign credits at one hundred percent of face value.
Public sector debt conversions require the prior approval of a com-
mission made up of the Ministers of Finance and Development and the
President of the Central Bank. The decree provides that the commission
may authorize conversions when the proceeds are to be invested in one
of a number of priority sectors or activities identified in the decree (for
example, agriculture, agroindustry, construction, capital goods produc-
tion, manufacture of chemical products, electronics, and informatics). The
capital invested by means of a public sector debt conversion may not be
repatriated during the first five years after the registration of the invest-
ment. During the eight years thereafter not more than 12.5 percent of the
capital may be exported annually. In addition, during the three years
following the investment, profits earned in respect of the investment may
not be remitted abroad at a rate in excess of ten percent annually of the
invested amount.
The decree does not go into detail with respect to the mechanics of
debt capitalizations or conversions. It provides that this aspect will be
covered by regulations to be issued by the Finance Ministry. Such reg-
ulations have yet to be issued.
The new debt-to-equity conversion program has thus far provoked little
serious interest among foreign investors. Many observers believe that a
principal reason for the lack of enthusiasm is the current requirement that
all foreign investments (whether made under the debt/equity program or
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not) be converted into Venezuelan currency at a controlled rate of U.S.
$1.00 to Bs 14.50, a rate far below the free-market rate of approximately
Bs 30 (as of August 1987). Although the current regulations also provide
that capital and profits may be remitted abroad at the same Bs 14.50 rate
at which the capital is brought in, foreign investors are understandably
skeptical that such a favorable rate will be available several years hence,
when they want to repatriate their investments.
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